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Comment on "Clio as Hostage"
FRANCIS STITES*
"History is among the most essential departments of knowl-
edge," John Marshall wrote in 1834, and "to an American, the
histories of England and of the United States are most instructive.
Every man ought to be intimately acquainted with the history of
his own country."1 There is no hostage Clio here. Marshall was
not speaking as an historian or a judge-although he was both of
these-but as a grandfather exhorting his grandson to a proper
and fruitful study. He is renowned for his "judicial-fiat" history
and famous, although less so, for his Life of Washington;2 but I
want to examine the context of this warm epistolary embrace of
history and, like Professor Wiecek, address the nature of the
history.
Wiecek raises important points: that there is no fixed body of
material called history; that context is essential in evaluating judi-
cial uses of history; that judicial decisions often need some history
supporting them; and that history sometimes is "simply beside the
point."3 Yet, an ambiguity about the term "history" percolates
through his discussion. Consider poor Clio, for example. She ap-
pears as "hostage," as "handmaiden," as "no one's unthinking
servant," and as "a lady of whimsical turn of mind."4 These con-
tradictory images raise my points: that history and the past are
not synonymous; and that "history" has a history. Because the
meaning of the word or discipline has changed over time, it also
has a context. So, part of evaluating the judicial use of history is
asking what history meant at the time the justices used it. Histori-
ans must evaluate judicial history by the standards of the time.
We forget this as we identify types of judicial history and then
examine a string of historical examples of the type. Two examples,
widely separated in time, may have only the label in common.
Let me return to John Marshall. Alfred Kelly noted in 1965
that Marshall's many judicial fiats showed "little if any inquiry
* Professor of History, San Diego State University.
1. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 55-57 (J.E.
Oster. ed. 1914 (John Marshall to his Grandson, November 7, 1834).
2. J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (2 vols., Philadelphia 1836).
3. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of
History, 24 CAL. W.L. REV. 227 (1988).
4. Id.
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into actual history. ' 5 Wiecek makes essentially the same point.
But what is "actual history?" More important, what was Mar-
shall's view of history, what were the standards of his time? What
was the context? How different was it from our own? These are
the crucial questions.
An answer emerges later in the letter when Marshall said that
David Hume was "generally thought the best Historian of Eng-
land," and noted that others had continued his narrative to a later
period.6 Now for Hume in the seventeenth century and those
others in the eighteenth century there was no substantial differ-
ence between the past and the present.7 The past, for him and for
Marshall, was an undifferentiated mass of information about the
human experience from which one deduced general principles. A
bewildering variety of specific differences could all point to the
same general principles. So, the attribute of history we count so
important, fidelity to the record, counted for little to those men.
The important thing was to transcend the details, to deduce and
declare the guiding principle, and to teach every man the history
of his country, as it ought to have been. One of the principles that
Hume had declared, as had Sir Edward Coke before him, was
that Anglo-Saxons had always been freedom loving and had strug-
gled to achieve it in their legal and political institutions, especially
the common law.8 Over time we have seen new definitions of his-
tory, but that principle surely still guides our examination of the
details.
Marshall, like other early nineteenth-century historians, did not
see the alteration of small details in the record as a betrayal of the
historian's canons. Quite the contrary! Such alterations in his
Washington, in his view, merely demonstrated his skill in teaching
the principles that the details of Washington's life revealed about
the American descendants of the ancient Anglo-Saxons. In that
biography, as in his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, for exam-
ple, Marshall was saying that we must never forget that it is prin-
ciples we are expounding. Kelly's note that this line read "like a
5. A. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, Sup. CT. REV. 119, 123
(1965).
6. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 1, at
54-55.
7. "Mankind are all so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs
us of nothing new or strong in this particular, [and] ... Its chief use is only to discover the
constant and universal principles of human nature." ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UN-
DERSTANDING § 8, pt. 1, 4:68 (1748); cited in D. LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN
COUNTRY, 47 (1985).
8. On Coke, see R. HORSMAN. RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 13-15 (1981); on Marshall, see Foran, John Mar-
shall as a Plagiarist, AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 51-64 XLIII (Oct. 1937).
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plea for an awareness of historical dynamics" is accurate if we
remember that the context for dynamics in 1819 was not the same
as in 1965.1 If we adjust Marshall's McCulloch comment about
ends and means to reflect accurately that period's different, didac-
tic approach to the past, it would read: If the principle be legiti-
mate, then all details "which are plainly adapted to that end," are
appropriate.10 It is not entirely historical to refer to such judicial
fiats simply as concoctions. In Marshall's time they were also good
history.
Approach to the past, not history, is the proper term, and this is
no small point. If we keep the history and the past separate and if
we remember that justices, especially when acting as such, are not
historians, then we might begin to see that it is the past and not
Clio that is hostage. Justices might use history in their constitu-
tional adjudication, but more often they use the past, and in the
ways Wiecek has so ably shown us with Holmes, Brandeis, Car-
dozo, Frankfurter, Jackson and Warren. Historians can also mis-
use the past by writing law-clerk history, and when they do, they
prostitute Clio. The two professions have different goals that they
bring to the use of the past and different standards to govern that
use. Justices focus on the present and its policy questions; histori-
ans focus on the past and probe things having no necessary con-
nection to the present-the original intent of the Framers, for ex-
ample. We need more comments like those of Justice Jackson and
Professor Wiecek that Court opinions may be "much stronger" for
their "forthright admission" that history is not pertinent. That
luxury is forbidden to the historian in a modern context.1"
From this vantage Clio appears less a hostage than a coquette
(or whimsical lady) that each generation eagerly pursues for the
instruction she can provide in the proper rituals of courtship and
the rewards she offers. Kelly saw her as a lover, although even he
felt constrained to add "illicit." Like the coquette, she changes her
appearance to entice different suitors. What she offers the justices
is not the recreation of a portion of a lost time but what Wiecek
calls the "lode of values," what Marshall in Marbury v. Madison
or Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut called "fundamental princi-
ples."'-2 These have a life of their own which has taken them into
expressions widely at variance with their Framers' intentions.
Justices ought to have what Leonard Levy has called an "his-
torical spirit" that keeps the principles in mind but allows creative
9. See A. Kelly, supra note 5, at 124.
10. 4 (Wheat.) 421 (1819).
11. Wieek, supra note 3.
12. Id.
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new application subject always to the merciless criticism of their
peers, the public, and, among others, historians. 13 Context deter-
mines the criticism, and policy, not simply historical accuracy, is
the guide. We condemn Dred Scott v. Sanford, more as bad pol-
icy than as bad history. Wiecek admits that in the context of the
legal system in which slave state jurists operated it "made
sense."' 14 Taney's was a failure of accuracy and a failure of the
historical spirit that would have recognized that the society had
moved beyond the original intent but not the principles of the
Framers. Wiecek's examination of the Court's work offers refresh-
ing illustrations that, despite such lapses as Dred Scott, practice
in the United States has often enlarged the meaning of principles.
Decisions like Brown v. Board of Education, Griswold v. Connect-
icut, Miranda v. Arizona, New York Times v. Sullivan, Roe v.
Wade, and others are devoid of "actual history" but filled with
historical spirit. Historians should note that.
. As we think about the relation between the historian and the
justice we ought to stay alert to the dangers of getting caught
between simple-minded arguments beginning either with "History
teaches us" or with "History is bunk." We need warnings like
Wiecek's especially during bicentennial orgies, lest we forever con-
tinue to read the past backwards from the present to find, in Har-
old Bloom's delightful phrase, our ancestors imitating us.'5 I am
one of those anti-instrumentalists Wiecek discussed, so my conclu-
sion that Clio can never be a teacher will come as no surprise.
13. L. Levy, History and Judicial History: The Case of the Fifth Amendment, in
L.W. LEvY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 208 (1986).
14. Wiecek, supra note 3.
15. H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 141-44 (1975), cited in D. LOWENTHAL-
supra note 7, at 71.
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